ELLIS et al v. PARKS

Supreme Court of Georgia1956-07-10No. 19366

212 Ga. 540

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment denying the defendants' motion to dismiss and for directed verdict, and granting an injunction against picketing in support of an unlawful strike, was affirmed because peaceful picketing undertaken solely to aid and give effect to a strike adjudged illegal by a federal court constitutes unprotected conduct subject to injunction.

A labor union conducted a strike and picketing campaign against an employer to gain recognition as the bargaining representative for the employer's workers. A federal court had previously determined that the strike was illegal because another union held the status as the lawful bargaining representative. The state court examined whether peaceful picketing receives constitutional protection and concluded that while lawful picketing for legitimate labor purposes is generally protected speech, picketing conducted to support an unlawful strike falls outside that protection. The court reasoned that when picketing is undertaken solely to injure an employer and advance an illegal labor action, the malicious purpose underlying the activity renders it unlawful, even though the picketing itself might otherwise constitute peaceful conduct.

The court emphasized that constitutional protections for speech and peaceful assembly do not shield conduct undertaken with malevolent intent to harm another party. The employer, like any other party, is entitled to equal protection under law against picketing designed to enforce an unlawful objective. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that federal labor law prevented the state from enjoining the picketing, finding that federal law does not protect unlawful conduct.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether peaceful picketing in support of an unlawfully adjudged strike receives constitutional protection
Whether malicious purpose underlying otherwise peaceful conduct renders that conduct unlawful
Whether state courts may enjoin picketing to enforce federal labor law determinations
Whether federal labor law preempts state court injunctions against picketing for unlawful purposes

Procedural posture

The defendants appealed a trial court judgment that denied their motion to dismiss and for a directed verdict and granted an injunction against picketing.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Duckworth, Chief Justice.

Art. 1, sec. 1, par. 2 of the Constitution (Code, Ann., § 2-102), which declares that “protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government, and shall be impartial and complete,” means something, and it places upon the Judiciary the duty to afford that protection. When members of a labor union while on strike picket their employer, their object is to aid the strike by thus pressuring their employer to yield to their demands. The law affords the laborers the protected right to thus employ lawful means to enforce their rights to give effect to all lawful strikes. But the employer is entitled to the protection of the law against picketing to aid an unlawful strike. The employer is entitled to the equal and impartial protection of the law just as much as the employee.

The record shows that the Printing Pressman’s Union called a strike against the petitioner to obtain recognition as the bargaining representative of the petitioner’s employees, and a judge of the United States District Court rendered judgment that the strike was illegal, since another union was the recognized legal bargaining representative, and these defendants are in conspiracy to aid the strike thus adjudged to be illegal. The record is silent as to whether or not the judgment of the Federal court is being appealed. This court said in Woodard v. Collier, 210 Ga. 239, 242 (78 S. E. 2d 526), that “It seems now to be rather well settled that the right to peacefully picket can not be interfered with by the courts unless the picketing is for an unlawful purpose. If it is for an unlawful purpose, it can and should be enjoined.” (Italics ours.) The judicial theory that peaceful picketing is a form of free speech, as announced in Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (60 Sup. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104), which is protected by the Constitutions, both Federal and State (Code, Ann., §§ 1-801, 2-115), can not be stretched to shield malevolent picketing for the purpose of injuring the employer and aiding an unlawful strike. Both the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Supreme Court of the United States have held that a person can not employ lawful acts for spite and solely for the purpose of injuring another, and that such malicious purpose renders the acts unlawful. Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491 (13 S. E. 2d 20, 133 A.L.R. 684); American Bank &c. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U. S. 350 (41 Sup. Ct. 499, 65 L. ed. 983, 25 A. L. R. 971). These defendants can not in good faith deny that the sole purpose of their picketing is to hurt petitioner, by publicity, by the annoyance of their presence, and by preventing other needed employees from working for the employer, all of which is intended to give effect to an unlawful strike which has been so adjudged by the court.

This State has the power to enforce its Constitution and laws in such a case, and the offenders can find no refuge behind the Taft-Hartley Act. That law was not intended to protect unlawful conduct. We find nothing in that law that would allow the National Labor Relations Board to give protection to this petitioner. For the foregoing reasons the court did not err in denying the defendants’ oral motion to dismiss and for a directed verdict or in granting the injunction.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Mobley, J., who dissents.

dissent opinion

Mobley, Justice,

dissenting. The decision of this court is predicated upon a ruling made by a judge of a United States District Court that the strike was illegal, and that so far as the record in this court indicated there was no appeal from such ruling. The judge of the district court, on motion by the plaintiff for a summary judgment, held that the strike was illegal, but he retained jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of determining damages. This was not a final decision from which an appeal would lie. 28 U. S. C. A. Rule 56 (c), (d); Tye v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 173 Fed. 2d 317 (2); Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works, 154 Fed. 2d 214 (3); Audi Vision v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 Fed. 2d 621; Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 130 Fed. 2d 535 (3). In my opinion, since the ruling of the Federal court judge was not a final judgment, it would not be a proper basis upon which to predicate this action, as there has beeen no final adjudication that the strike was illegal.