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FRANKLIN et al. v. SING-WILKES, INC.

Supreme Court of Georgia1960-01-08No. 20684
215 Ga. 596

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of the temporary injunction against the defendants and its denial of the defendants' cross-petition for a temporary injunction, holding that where evidence is conflicting at an interlocutory hearing on a temporary injunction, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in either granting or denying such relief.

Franklin and Sing-Wilkes, Inc. became embroiled in a dispute over the operation of a service station in Thomasville. The defendants made repeated complaints to police about noise and disturbances allegedly caused by the station's night operations, including noise from tire changing, air compressors, and loud talking. The plaintiffs claimed these complaints were pretextual and motivated by a desire to force the station to close rather than address genuine violations of city ordinances. The trial court issued a temporary injunction preventing the defendants from interfering with or harassing the plaintiffs' employees and customers, and denied the defendants' cross-petition for an injunction to stop the noise and disturbances.

The defendants appealed, challenging the grant of the temporary injunction. The appellate court addressed the standard of review for temporary injunctions when evidence is conflicting. Under established precedent, when evidence presented at an interlocutory hearing is contradictory, an appellate court cannot find that a trial court abused its discretion by either granting or denying a temporary injunction.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Standard of review for temporary injunctions when evidence is conflicting
  • Whether defendants' complaints to police constituted harassment motivated by improper purpose
  • Abuse of discretion standard in interlocutory injunction proceedings

Procedural posture

The defendants appealed an order granting a temporary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs and denying the defendants' cross-petition for a temporary injunction, by exception to the trial court's order.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Ducicworth, Chief Justice.

This case is here, on an exception to an order granting a temporary injunction after a hearing on a petition to enjoin certain lawful acts, alleged to1 be done for the illegal purpose of harassing the defendant by making continued calls and complaints to the police of the City of Thomasville about alleged noises and other breaches of the peace emanating from the petitioner’s business in Thomasville. The allegations show that the complaints are not for the purpose of prosecuting the commission of any crime or violation of city ordinances, but are for the purpose of harassing the petitioner in its lawful business to cause it to discontinue its night-service->station operations at this particular station. By cross-action the defendants sought an injunction to prevent certain noises and disturbances originating at said service station. The order excepted to enjoined the defendants, until the further order of the court, from interfering with or harassing the petitioners’ employees and customers as prayed in the petition. The prayers of the petition sought among other things to prevent the defendants from making telephone calls to the police department and making prosecutions and suing out warrants against the petitioner’s employees in the operation of said station and its customers. At the hearing it was stipulated that approximately 8 cases had been made against a person or persons for alleged breaches of the peace at the service station, involving noise. These cases had been disposed of in the Recorder’s Court of Thomasville, but are now pending on appeal in the superior court. The evidence and the stipulations showed that the property, which had been residential, has been zoned for business ; that the noises around such station are the usual noises made by the operation of such a business; that, since the beginning of the business, the petitioner’s officers and employees and the defendants have been in continuous altercation and discussion over the operation of the service station; that one of the defendants had made the statement that, if the petitioner did not close at night, he would see if he couldn’t get him closed; that the arrests of customers and employees had hurt the petitioner’s business; and that the defendants had called the police complaining of noises of tire changing, loud talking, air compressors running, and other varied noises and that cases had been made by the police after being so summoned. Held:

1. This court has repeatedly held that, where the evidence is conflicting at an interlocutory hearing to determine whether or not the lower court should grant or deny a temporary injunction, it can not be said that the court abused its discretion in either granting or denying the injunction. Code § 55-108; Deriso v. Castleberry, 202 Ga. 174 (3) (42 S. E. 2d 356); Fitzgerald v. Head, 202 Ga. 640 (44 S. E. 2d 117); Jones v. Camp, 208 Ga. 164 (1) (65 S. E. 2d 596); Moultrie Milk Shed v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348. (57 S.E. 2d 199); Davis v. Deariso, 210 Ga. 717 (82 S. E. 2d 509); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 (13 S. E. 2d 807); Log Cabin Steak Co. v. Burton, 212 Ga. 648 (94 S. E. 2d 694); Ellis v. Parks, 212 Ga. 540 (93 S. E. 2d 708); Fleming v. H. W. Ivey Construction Co., 215 Ga. 460 (111 S. E. 2d 97). It follows that the court did not err in granting a temporary injunction against the defendants and in refusing to grant the temporary injunction prayed for in the cross-action.

Argued November 9, 1959

Decided January 8, 1960.

B. B. Earle, Jr., Altman & Johnson, for plaintiffs in error.

Cain & Smith, S. P. Cnin, contra.

2. The exception to the failure of the court to rule on and sustain the demurrers to the petition, after a hearing thereon in which the court reserved its rulings thereon, is treated as abandoned since counsel for the plaintiff in error has failed to argue it either in the brief or orally before this court. Furthermore, the exception is to no judgment and hence presents nothing for a decision.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.