Harry G. Fiske & another, trustees, vs. City of Worcester

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1914-12-09

219 Mass. 428

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the judgment for the defendant, holding that under the revised charter, contracts for city departments must be made and executed by the administrative boards and officers in charge of those departments, with mayoral signature required only for validity when the amount exceeds three hundred dollars, and that the mayor lacked independent authority to originate such contracts.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a contract for the purchase of four automobile fire wagons that the mayor executed on behalf of Worcester. The mayor claimed authority under charter provisions granting him general executive power and control of city affairs. However, the court examined the charter's complete framework and found that administrative boards and department heads, not the mayor alone, possessed the authority to make and execute contracts within their respective departments.

The charter established that while contracts exceeding three hundred dollars required the mayor's signature to be valid, the initial authority to make such contracts rested with the administrative boards and officers in charge of departments. Because the fire department board of engineers, not the mayor, had the power to make this contract, and the record showed no evidence that the board made or authorized the contract, the mayor's unilateral execution of it was ineffective. The prescribed mode of contracting in the charter was exclusive and limited the mayor's role to approval rather than origination.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Scope of mayoral executive power under the city charter
Authority to make and execute contracts on behalf of the city
Role of administrative boards and department heads in the contracting process
Whether the prescribed mode of contracting is exclusive

Procedural posture

The case came before the court on a report of facts, with the trial judge having ruled that the contract could not be enforced.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Braley, J.

The plaintiffs’ right of recovery depends upon whether under the provisions of the revised charter found in St. of 1893, c. 444, the mayor was authorized to execute in behalf of the city the contract in question.

It is declared in § 2, that the government, general management and control of all the fiscal, prudential and municipal affairs of the city shall be vested in a single officer called the mayor, and in a body to be called the city council, except that control of the. public schools shall be vested in a school committee. By § 23, “The mayor shall be the chief executive officer of the city, and the executive powers of the city shall be vested in him and be exercised by him either personally or through the several officers and boards in their respective departments, under his general supervision and control,” and by § 24, “The mayor shall communicate to the city council such information and shall recommend such measures as, in his judgment, the interests of the city shall require; shall cause the laws, ordinances and orders for the government of the city to be enforced; and shall secure an honest, efficient and economical conduct of the executive and administrative business of the city, and the harmonious and concerted action of the different administrative and executive departments. The mayor may at any time summon heads of departments or subordinate officers for information, consultation, or advice upon the affairs of the city.” The plaintiffs rely on these sections as having conferred upon him ample power not merely of supervision but to make and execute in behalf of the city all contracts necessary for the maintenance and efficiency of the several departments.

But the scheme or framework of government is to be ascertained from all the provisions of the charter. The fire department for whose use the four automobile combination chemical and hose wagons were ordered having been established under § 42, it is a department of the city and the board of engineers lawfully created by ordinance is an administrative board within the purview of § 40. Bowers v. Selectmen of Needham, 216 Mass. 422. By § 40 the several administrative boards and officers having charge of departments “shall, within their respective departments,make and execute all necessary contracts, subject to the provisions of section eighteen of this act, employ all labor, purchase all materials and supplies, have charge of the construction, alteration and repair of all public buildings and works, have the entire care, custody and management of all public works, institutions, buildings and other property, and shall in general have the immediate direction and control of all executive and administrative business; and they shall at all times be accountable for the proper discharge of their duties to the mayor as the chief executive officer of the city.” It is further provided, that “all contracts made in behalf of the city in which the amount involved exceeds three hundred dollars shall, in order to be valid, require the signature of the mayor, and, except as herein otherwise provided or by law required, no expenditure shall be made or liability incurred for any purpose beyond the appropriations previously made therefor.”

The words, “the several administrative boards and officers having charge of departments shall, within their respective departments, make and execute all necessary contracts,” cannot be divested of their natural import and signification. The contract must be made and executed by them, but if the amount involved exceeds three hundred dollars it is ineffectual unless approved by the mayor. Goddard v. Lowell, 179 Mass. 496. Webb Granite & Construction Co. v. Worcester, 187 Mass. 385, 389, 390. Ryan v. Boston, 204 Mass. 456. Commercial Wharf Cory. v. Boston, 208 Mass. 482, 488. Sullivan v. Mandell, 212 Mass. 174, 177, 178. The reference to § 18, where the city council or either branch is prohibited from taking part in the making of contracts “except as may hereafter be otherwise provided by ordinance,” need not be considered, as no ordinance making such provisions is referred to in the record.

The mode of contracting having been prescribed and limited by the charter it is exclusive, and the plaintiffs are bound by the limitation. Adams v. County of Essex, 205 Mass. 189, 197. We are therefore of opinion that the trial judge correctly ruled that the contract could not be enforced, and under the terms of the report judgment is to be entered for the defendant.

So ordered.