Randolph H. Boynton vs. American Express Company

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1915-05-21

221 Mass. 237

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court's directed verdict for the plaintiff is reversed, and judgment is entered for the defendant. The plaintiff was bound by the limitation-of-liability clause in the express receipt because the written receipt constituted the complete contract, no value was declared at shipment, and the defendant's driver had no authority to waive the contract's terms.

Randolph Boynton sent a trunk via American Express from Portland, Maine to West Springfield, Massachusetts. The trunk was lost in transit, and Boynton sued for full value as a common carrier's breach of contract. American Express relied on a limitation-of-liability clause in the receipt provided at shipment, which capped recovery at a fixed sum unless the trunk's true value had been declared in advance. Boynton argued that the express company's driver should have asked about the trunk's value and inquired of Boynton at his office when the opportunity arose, and that the driver's failure to do so meant the company should be treated as an insurer for the full amount.

The court rejected Boynton's argument. The driver had no authority to waive or modify the contract terms, nor did he agree to make further inquiry on Boynton's behalf. The written receipt, delivered at the time the trunk was handed over, constituted the entire contract between the parties. Boynton was bound by its terms through his agent, regardless of whether he had read them. Since no value was declared at shipment, the limitation clause applied. Boynton could not selectively enforce the contract's benefits while disregarding its protective limitations.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a common carrier's liability limitation in a shipping receipt applies when no declaration of value was made
Whether a carrier's agent had authority to waive contract terms or agree to make further inquiry about value
Whether a shipper is bound by receipt terms not read before loss occurred

Procedural posture

The trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff; the question on appeal was whether judgment for the defendant should be entered as a matter of law.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Braley, J.

The agreed statement of facts on which the presiding judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff is not within the St. of 1913, c. 716, § 5, permitting inferences of fact by this court, and the question presented by the report is, whether as matter of law on the evidence submitted the verdict should stand or judgment should be ordered for the defendant. Norton v. Brookline, 181 Mass. 360. Bullock v. Haverhill & Boston Dispatch Co. 187 Mass. 91.

The defendant is engaged in an interstate express business, and received the plaintiff’s trunk at Portland, Maine, for transportation to West Springfield in this Commonwealth. The trunk and its contents having been lost in transit, no delivery has been made, and the plaintiff, having discontinued as to the second count of the declaration, relies upon the first count, which alleges that the defendant as a common carrier is liable in damages for breach of the contract. We assume, in the absence of any argument to the contrary, that the common law of the place of contract is the same as the law of the forum, and the measure of recovery, therefore, rests upon the terms of the contract of shipment. Callender, McAuslan & Troup Co. v. Flint, 187 Mass. 104. Hooker v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 209 Mass. 598. Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97.

It is agreed that the plaintiff instructed one Annie Olson, in whose possession and control the trunk had been left, “to deliver the trunk to the expressman when he called for it.” The defendant’s driver called, but at whose request does not affirmatively appear, when the trunk was delivered without the charges being prepaid, and the receipt described in the record was given and accepted. It contained a clause limiting the company’s liability to a fixed sum for non-delivery, if the true value was not declared at the date of shipment, and, no declaration appearing, the defendant upon the face of the contract is not responsible in excess of this amount. Bernard v. Adams Express Co. 205 Mass. 254, 258. Peirce v. American Express Co. 210 Mass. 383. Johnson v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad, 217 Mass. 203.

The plaintiff however maintains that he is not bound by the limitation, because the driver when he took the trunk gnd gave the receipt, having asked for the value and being requested to make inquiry of the plaintiff at his office, should have complied, and his failure to inquire having prevented a declaration of value, the defendant received the trunk “as an insurer for full value.”

But the driver had no authority to waive any portion of the contract, nor did he, in fact, assent to the request or direction of the plaintiff’s representative, or become her messenger. It is unnecessary under the circumstances to decide whether the plaintiff could recover, if the receipt is entirely displaced or ignored. If the plaintiff was ignorant of its terms until after the trunk had been lost, he did know of them when the action was brought. While no express reference thereto is found in the declaration, the only contract declared on is unmistakably shown by the agreed facts to be the contract within the four corners of the receipt. The parties plainly did not deal upon the assumption and understanding that the contract was to be partly oral and partly in writing, as in Davis v. Cress, 214 Mass. 379, 382. And the delivery of the trunk and receipt were concurrent. The failure to read it, where no fraud or concealment by the defendant appears, does not estop the company from reliance on all of its terms. Graves v. Adams Express Co. 176 Mass. 280, 282. It follows that the plaintiff is bound by the contract made in his behalf by his servant or agent. Edgar v. Joseph Breck & Sons Corp. 172 Mass. 581. Partridge v. White, 59 Maine, 564. And having accepted the receipt, which contained no valuation, he cannot avail himself of the benefit of the contract and ignore the limitation inserted for the defendant’s protection.

A tender of the amount due having been made before suit, and the money paid into court, judgment is to be entered for the defendant. R. L. c. 174, § 12.

So ordered.