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George D. Davis vs. Leonidas H. Cress

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1913-05-20
214 Mass. 379

Summary

Holding. The exceptions are overruled and the trial judgment is affirmed. The defendant was not personally obligated on the letter, which constituted part of an oral agreement with the corporation rather than an independent personal contract with the defendant.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant based on a letter that the plaintiff claimed constituted a personal contract between them. The evidence established, and the trial judge found, that the letter was actually part of a larger oral agreement made between the plaintiff and a corporation for which the defendant served as treasurer, not a personal contract with the defendant himself. The plaintiff testified he did not know the defendant held an official position, but the judge's finding—based on all the evidence—that the plaintiff understood the defendant was acting on behalf of the company is conclusive. Since a contract need not be entirely in writing when the parties have not reduced their full agreement to writing, evidence may be admitted to show what the actual contract was and to prove that a written portion does not represent the completed agreement.

The defendant's letter, when read in context with the judge's findings, makes clear that the defendant was not personally engaged in the manufacturing business that was the subject of the agreement. The goods were to be supplied by the company, and the promise of compensation was made by the corporation as the principal, not by the defendant individually. Because the defendant never became personally obligated under the contract, the trial judge properly rejected the plaintiff's position, and therefore any jury instructions not given on that point were immaterial to the outcome.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a written letter can form a personal contract when the evidence shows it was part of a larger oral agreement with a corporation
  • Whether a contract partly oral and partly written may be proved by evidence outside the written portion
  • Whether the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the defendant's official capacity affects the interpretation that the defendant acted as agent for the corporation

Procedural posture

The plaintiff's exceptions to the trial judge's findings and rulings were preserved and properly raised for appellate review.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Braley, J.

The plaintiff’s exceptions were duly saved and are properly before us. R. L. c. 173, § 106. St. 1906, c. 342, § 3, St. 1911, c. 212. Richards v. Appley, 187 Mass. 521. Graves v. Hicks, 194 Mass. 524.

It is manifest, however, that the action cannot be maintained unless the letter declared on is the personal contract of the defendant. The evidence abundantly showed, and the judge has found, that it constitutes part of an oral contract between the plaintiff and the corporation of which the defendant was treasurer. A contract not required by law to be in writing may be partly oral and partly written, and where the parties have not put the entire agreement in writing, evidence that the portion in writing does not constitute the completed contract, or to show what the contract really was, is always admissible. Stewart v. Thayer, 170 Mass. 560, 562. Commonwealth v. National Contracting Co. 201 Mass. 248. Potter v. Hopkins, 25 Wend. 417. Marsh v. Dodge, 66 N. Y. 533. Hussey v. Horne-Payne, 4 App. Cas. 311. The plaintiff testified, that he was ignorant of the defendant’s official position, but the finding of the judge upon all the evidence, that, at the inception of the agreement, the plaintiff understood the defendant was acting for the company, is conclusive. American Malting Co. v. Souther Brewing Co. 194 Mass. 89. If the closing language of the letter received by the plaintiff after he had entered upon his employment, “it is understood that this applies only to the tools plant etc. we supply to the proposed English Co and not to any manufactured goods we may supply until the English factory is in operating order,” is read in connection with the finding, it is apparent, that the defendant was not engaged individually in manufacturing safety razors of the brand which were to be placed upon a foreign market through the efforts of the plain tiff. It also is to be presumed under the finding, that he must have known the goods to be furnished until the anticipated sale of the foreign patent had been accomplished, were to be supplied by the company. The parties evidently never reduced their entire agreement to writing, and while it cannot be varied, the actual contract may be ascertained from all the circumstances. DeFriest v. Bradley, 192 Mass. 346. The letter, therefore, cannot be disconnected and treated as an independent undertaking, and the promise of compensation if the plaintiff succeeded in negotiating a sale, is the promise of the principal with whom the plaintiff knowingly dealt. The conclusion of the judge that the defendant never became personally obligated having been warranted, the requests in so far as they were not given, are immaterial. Goodenough v. Thayer, 132 Mass. 152. Steamship Bulgarian Co. v. Merchants’ Despatch Transportation Co. 135 Mass. 421.

To avoid any misconception we add, that although the alleged contract was made abroad, no proof of the foreign law having been introduced, the decision is in accordance with the provisions of onr own law. Callender, McAuslan & Troup Co. v. Flint, 187 Mass. 104.

Exceptions overruled.