HUDSON v. HUDSON, admr, and vice versa

Supreme Court of Georgia1896-02-07

98 Ga. 147

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court reversed the judgment, holding that a party in a common law case referred to an auditor possesses a constitutional right to jury trial on questions of fact raised by exceptions, and that consent to a procedural order does not constitute a waiver of this right.

This case involved a common law action requiring settlement of complex accounts. The trial court referred the matter to an auditor, who submitted a report addressing both factual and legal conclusions. When the plaintiff filed exceptions challenging the auditor's findings, the trial judge resolved all disputed questions of fact and law without submitting the factual disputes to a jury. The plaintiff objected to this procedure, arguing he retained a constitutional right to jury trial on questions of fact. The court agreed that in common law cases referred to an auditor, either party maintains the right to have a jury determine factual questions raised by exceptions, and that merely consenting to an order allowing the judge to examine the auditor's report in chambers does not waive this fundamental right. The judge's proper role is to classify exceptions into legal and factual categories, determine the legal questions, and submit factual ones to the jury.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether consent to an order allowing judicial examination of an auditor's report waives the right to jury trial on factual questions
The proper role of a trial judge in classifying and deciding questions raised by exceptions to an auditor's report
The constitutional right to jury trial in common law cases involving auditors' reports
What constitutes a sufficient auditor's report when it includes alternative findings

Procedural posture

The trial court referred a common law action involving settlement of accounts to an auditor, and upon receipt of the auditor's report with exceptions filed, the court determined all disputed questions of fact and law before rendering judgment against the plaintiff.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Atkinson, Justice.

1-2. The present case was an ordinary action at law,- but under the pleadings filed, involved a settlement of complicated accounts. No equitable relief was prayed, or would have been authorized by the pleadings. The cause was referred to an auditor; his report covered conclusions both of law and of fact. Exceptions of fact were filed, as well as exceptions of law. The party filing -the exceptions did not expressly waive the right of trial by jury, but notwithstanding this, the court proceeded to determine all questions, both of law and fact, and found adversely to the plaintiff. He complains among other things of the action of the court in thus undertaking to determine the questions of fact presented by his exceptions, and we think his complaint is well founded. The case of Poullain v. Brown, administrator, 80 Ga. 27, seems conclusive of the proposition, that in all cases involving the prosecution of only common law remedies, and which are referred to an auditor, it is the constitutional right of either party to have his exceptions of fact passed upon by a jury. It was urged in reply h> this, that the plaintiff had waived his right of trial by jury upon these questions of fact; and it was attempted to support this contention by showing that the plaintiff had consented to an order made in term time, in which it was provided that the report of the auditor shall “be examined and passed upon in vacation” by the presiding judge. We do not think that a consent to such an order amounts to a waiver of trial by jury, or can be construed into consenting that the judge shall try and determine the questions of fact without the intervention of a jury. That order might properly have referred to that other duty devolving upon the trial judge, which requires that upon return of exceptions to an auditor’s report, he shall be required to pass upon, examine and classify the questions made into two distinct classes, that is to say, stating which exceptions in his judgment present mere matters of law, and which present questions of fact; and having thus classified the questions, it becomes his duty to determine the matters of law, submitting to the jury the matters of fact. Inasmuch as the consent order might have been properly referred to the exercise of this power and duty by the circuit judge, saving to the party excepting his right of trial by jury, a construction of it which imports into1 the order another significance, the effect of which is to. deprive the party of this important right, should not have been adopted; and we consequently hold, that consenting to such an order is not equivalent to a waiver of trial by jury upon, the questions of fact made in the case.

3-4. The propositions stated in the 3d and 4th head-notes do not require further elaboration.

5. We do not think it a good reason for the suppression of the report of an auditor, that he failed to find absolutely upon each of the matters of law and fact to which his report, related. "Where he states the facts found by him and states a conclusion reached by him from such facts, and further1 states that if this conclusion be incorrect, then another consequence would result than that indicated, in his first finding, the report is sufficient; and the court, upon consideration of the exceptions, may correct any improper finding of the auditor, or adopt either of the alternative results suggested by the report, provided they are sustained by law.

Juclgment reversed.